By John Wiley
 
Fuel. It is not only the topic of the day, it is also a major topic in Congress. Granted, the primary focus has been on $4/gallon auto gas, but the increased costs have also hammered the aviation community. The old aviation maxim -- "The only time you have too much fuel is when you are on fire" -- has been preempted with the question, "Do you really need that much fuel?"

When I became an airline first officer in 1978, it was not uncommon for a captain to request "Load allowable." That meant upload the maximum fuel the jet could carry and still be legal for takeoff and landing. Compared to the current situation, we were very fat on fuel. Recent dust-ups over fuel made headlines after one airline called in some senior four stripers for "re-education." Their error? They had requested more fuel. This came as airlines began denying extra fuel and jettisoning magazines, meals and even some of the potable water. Saying every ounce counts is not overstating the case today. Extra weight means extra consumption, which means extra expense.

In 2000, airlines paid on average about $0.90 per gallon for Jet-A. That cost increased to $1.20 by 2004 and reached $1.97 by 2006. The real jump has occurred in 2008 with airlines paying about $3.91 per gallon. U.S. carriers, paying with the weak U.S. dollar, have seen a one-year fuel price increase of 53 percent. Fuel is now their number one expense, easily surpassing labor, and the numbers keep getting bigger and bigger.

In 2003, according to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), U.S. airlines spent $44 billion for fuel and IATA estimates they will spend more than $176 billion in 2008. The one-year cost increase between 2007 and 2008 is about $40 billion, slightly less than the entire fuel costs in 2003. Those numbers have not been lost on general aviation.

Since 1997, the business aviation community has doubled its consumption of jet fuel, while avgas consumption has fallen by 83 million barrels when compared to the high point in 1999. Still, the costs are enormous when, according to the Aviation Research Group/U.S. (ARG/US), the average price of jet fuel at the pump is $6.42 and the average price of avgas is $6.21.

Fuel in the News

US Airways drew unwelcome attention to itself when it called in eight senior captains to find out why they requested more fuel than what was called for in their original flight plans. But that event was not the first rumble over fuel, even though the earlier quarrel did not attract as much media focus. The incidents provided political fuel for New Jersey Democratic Sens. Robert Menendez and Frank Lautenberg, who asked the FAA to investigate the increased minimum and emergency fuel declarations for aircraft arriving at Newark's Liberty International Airport (EWR).

Menendez crowed in a press release, "For far too long the Federal Aviation Administration was unaware as planes were landing at Newark low on fuel. Thankfully there were no major disasters but aircraft should not be cutting it that close -- with airline safety there is no room for error. I am encouraged to know the FAA is now addressing this problem but it should not take letters from lawmakers to guarantee the safety of the flying public. One day, I hope the FAA will be able to be proactive and not need to be asked to do its job." Harrumph!

Harrumph, indeed, but there is problem with the legislators' tiff. The FAA normally does not track or investigate minimum fuel declarations, only emergency fuel declarations. At least that was the protocol prior to the senators' inquiry.

On April 9, 2008, Calvin L. Scovel III, the DOT inspector general, responded to the senators, noting, "We found minimum and emergency fuel declarations had increased on flights into the Newark area; however, there were no instances where aircraft landed with fuel levels below those required by the FAA [based on the 20 flights reviewed]." Scovel attributed some of the declarations to different interpretations by pilots and controllers over the terms "minimum fuel" and "emergency fuel." Scovel did say that although controllers are not required to file minimum fuel incident reports, the New York TRACON did file 12 incidents with the local Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), which in turn chose not to investigate 11 of the reports.

The IG also found that of the 151 minimum fuel declarations, two-thirds were from international flights and Continental Airlines had 96 (64 percent) of them. However, a review of 20 of those flights showed none arrived with less than 45 minutes fuel and the average landing fuel was 64 minutes. With Continental in the headlights, the FAA did find things upon which to comment.

The agency voiced concern about company bulletins sent to the Continental pilots. A February 2007 bulletin expressed concern over the "higher than expected" fuel stops en route from Europe to EWR and the second, in October 2007, said, ". . . adding fuel indiscriminately without critical thinking ultimately reduces profit sharing and possibly pension funding." The FAA thought the letters might create undue pressure on pilots to depart with insufficient fuel or to press on to destination with dwindling reserves. Continental representatives said the bulletins were merely informative and were not meant to exert any pressure and that excessive fuel reserves did not necessarily enhance safety.

Still, one published flight -- Barcelona, Spain (LEBL) to EWR -- caught the FAA's attention. Scovel wrote that the crews operating the Boeing 757 flight declared minimum fuel 23 times in 2007. This prompted the FSDO to notify the Continental chief pilot that it appeared the flight was using fuel declarations as a ". . . flight planning tool" to simply reach a destination rather than going to an alternate airport. The inspector advised that if this continued, the FAA would issue a violation. Subsequent FAA inquiries found no safety trends or specific flights with repeat problems. The FAA added that there had been no similar increase of minimum/ emergency fuel declarations into La Guardia Airport (LGA) or John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK).

Definitions

Some, if not many, aviators think the FARs define minimum or emergency fuel. They do not. Often FAR Part 91.167 is offered as a definitive explanation, but it only states what fuel is required for dispatch -- that is, fuel to destination, fuel to alternate, if required, and 45 minutes' worth at a normal cruising speed (30 minutes for helicopters). And while many aviators seem to agree on 45 minutes' worth as minimum fuel and 30 minutes as the point at which to declare emergency fuel, that is a rule of thumb and not codified in the FARs. Also, the 45 minutes of fuel is typically referred to as reserve fuel and in an Information for Operators letter (InFO 08004), the FAA said that consuming reserve fuel is not in itself a cause to declare minimum fuel. It adds that when declaring minimum or emergency fuel, the pilot will add "minimum fuel" to the call sign (for example "Atlanta, Barnburner 123, minimum fuel").

So where to find an explanation of minimum fuel? The Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), states, "Minimum fuel indicates that an aircraft's fuel supply has reached a state where, upon reaching the destination, it can accept little or no delay. This is not an emergency situation but merely indicates an emergency situation is possible should any undue delay occur." Notice there is no time element mentioned. And what constitutes "undue delay"? It does not say.

FAA Order 7110.65R (Air Traffic Control) addresses the subject of minimum fuel in section 2-1-8, which states, "If an aircraft declares 'minimum fuel' inform any facility to whom control jurisdiction is transferred of the minimum fuel problem and be alert for any occurrence that might delay the aircraft en route." Note that a minimum fuel declaration does not imply any need for priority routing or handling. An emergency fuel declaration does.

Again, there is no AIM or FAR definition of "emergency fuel." However, in InFO 08004 we find that emergency fuel is "the point at which, in the judgment of the pilot-in-command, it is necessary to proceed directly to the airport of intended landing due to low fuel. Declaration of a fuel emergency is an explicit statement that priority handling by ATC is both required and expected" (writer's italics). That seems clear enough, yet at least two airliners have crashed due to fuel exhaustion.

United 173

Few accidents have received more publicity than the 1978 crash of United Air Lines 173, a DC-8-61 that flamed out on final to Portland, Ore., International Airport (PDX). That crash is frequently cited as the trigger for developing Crew Resource Management. The United crew was very experienced, with the captain having logged in excess of 27,000 hours of flight time, the first officer with more than 5,200 hours and the flight engineer with almost 3,900 hours as an engineer.

The aircraft left Denver with 46,700 pounds of fuel and planned to land with 13,800 pounds. However, when the crew extended the landing gear on final to PDX, there was an indication of a problem and the captain decided to hold at 5,000 feet until the gear could be verified as down and locked. Fuel on board was 13,800 pounds and post-accident tests showed the fuel gauges to be accurate.

Over the next hour the F/E repeatedly informed the pilots of the ever-decreasing fuel level. At 32 minutes after dropping the gear, the flight was down to 5,000 pounds of fuel and the F/E advised the captain that fuel low level lights were illuminating. Still, the captain remained focused on the indication problem and told the F/O it would take another 20 minutes before they could land.

Later, when the captain told the crew, ". . . figure about another 15 minutes," the F/E responded, "Not enough. Fifteen minutes is going to run us low on fuel here." At 54 minutes past gear extension United 173 was finally headed to the runway when the F/O announced, "I think we just lost number four." Two minutes later the number three engine flamed out and 61 minutes after extending the gear, the captain advised ATC, "They're all going. We can't make Troutdale" (a small airport on the final approach path to PDX). Then the F/O interjected, "We can't make anything." Only then did the captain advise the F/O, "OK, declare a Mayday."

The DC-8 crashed six miles short of the runway. The accident report states, "There was no fire." The crash seriously injured 23 on board, and killed eight passengers and a flight attendant.

Avianca 52

On Jan. 25, 1990, Avianca Flight 52 departed Bogota, Colombia, for JFK with an en route stop in Medellin, Colombia. Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) was the JFK alternate. The Boeing 707-321B departed Medellin with 79,930 pounds of fuel, which accounted for a 55,000-pound burn to JFK, 4,510-pound reserve, 7,600-pound for alternate BOS, 4,800 pounds for holding and 1,500 pounds for taxi. The captain requested and got an additional 2,000 pounds in Medellin. The crew, like that on United 173, was experienced.

En route to New York, the flight held at three fixes for 77 minutes. At the third holding fix, with all planned holding fuel consumed, the crew advised ATC they could hold no longer than five minutes and the F/O said, "I think we need priority . . ." The crew then briefed the JFK ILS noting that due to the low fuel condition, they needed to be careful how they would execute a go-around. The crew was concerned that acceleration and pitch angles could cause wing fuel pumps to cavitate. (In February 1980, Boeing issued a letter to B-707 operators stating that it was advisable to land with not less than 7,000 pounds indicated due to possible errors in the fuel indicators. Boeing issued a later letter that said with maximum errors a landing with 4,000 pounds on board might indicate as low as 1,300 pounds or as high as 6,700 pounds.)

On the ILS final, Avianca 52 went around because of an unstable approach and wind shear. The captain instructed the F/O, "Tell them we are in [sic] emergency . . ." The F/O advised ATC, ". . . we are running out of fuel," but did not declare an emergency. And in spite of the dire circumstances, communication between the aircraft and ATC remained relaxed and cordial, with no indication of alarm.

(Note: the NTSB accident report suggests that the captain had a limited command of English and did not understand that the F/O had not declared an emergency. Furthermore, the crew apparently thought they were receiving priority handling.)

Twenty four minutes after first contacting the final controller, the Avianca flight was vectored for a second approach. The final controller told the crew, ". . . I'm going to bring you about 15 miles northeast and then turn you back on for the approach. Is that fine with you and your fuel?" The F/O replied, "I guess so. Thank you very much." Eight minutes later the F/E told the captain, "Flame out . . flame out on engine number four." Ten seconds later the F/O advised ATC, ". . . we just ah lost two engines and uh we need priority, please." Eighteen seconds later the controller cleared the flight for the ILS. When the controller then asked if the flight had enough fuel to reach the airport, there was no response. Of the 158 people on board, the three cockpit crewmembers died along with five flight attendants and 65 passengers. There was no post-crash fire and the analysis of the engines showed no evidence of rotation or power on impact.

NASA ASRS

A search of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) with key words "minimum fuel" turned up more than 600 reports. Additional searches for "low fuel" found more than 700 reports and 15 reports with "emergency fuel;" however, many of those were duplicates of the first search. Reading through more than 300 reports revealed some important points.

Although the FARs may not require an alternate, the smart aviator has one and maybe two airfields in mind just in case the destination becomes unavailable. This can happen for many different reasons including a fire in the control tower (ASRS Report #541589), winds go out of limits, wind shear (ASRS Report #712483), runway closed due to disabled aircraft or just unexpected problems such as system failures. Crews may also have to resort to unusual solutions. This is evident in the following reports:

*An Embraer ERJ 140 arrives at a field that has a total radar outage. The aircraft then has an engine anti-ice failure and the crew has to perform abnormal procedures en route to alternate. The crew declares emergency fuel (ASRS Report #731312).

*A Boeing 737 arrives at GEG after dark with no alternate. The runway lights are out. Nearby airports cannot accept the flight and the crew declares an emergency to land (ASRS Report #621793).

*A Boeing 737 misses the first approach due to wind shear and weather quickly goes below minimums. The crew diverts to an alternate only to find it, too, has wind shear and low ceilings. The flight diverts to a second alternate after declaring emergency fuel (ASRS Report #718165).

*A Boeing 757 misses two approaches at destination and diverts to its primary alternate. Again, no declarations. On approach, the crew breaks out of weather and sees an airplane on runway. Tower advises the 757 to go-around, but the crew then declares emergency fuel and lands (ASRS Report #720402).

*A B737 crew makes the same decision when told to go-around and lands with 3, 200 pounds (about 30 minutes' worth) of fuel remaining (ASRS Report #720065).

Another problem that appears regularly in reports involves alternate airports becoming unusable. Some examples:

*A Boeing 747-400 arrives with no holding fuel and rapidly depletes its "extra fuel," which is only 12 minutes' worth. The crew then declares minimum fuel, but goes missed due to wind shear. Nearby airfields are not accepting any more arrivals. The crew declares an emergency and lands at a military field (ASRS Report #712483).

*The crew holds for a storm that does not clear. Again, the primary alternate is not accepting any more flights so the crew elects to go to a secondary alternate that turns out to be beyond their fuel supply. The crew heads for a third airport, but does not declare an emergency. While the aircraft is on final approach, the tower clears two airplanes onto the runway for takeoff. The crew writes, "We blocked in with 3,000 pounds of fuel. If one of the aircraft had aborted we would have been in an extreme emergency" (ASRS Report #697165).

*A Boeing 737 heads to Raleigh-Durham International Airport (RDU) with alternates of Norfolk International (ORF) and Richmond International (RIC) airports. En route, the dispatcher changes the alternate to North Carolina's Piedmont Triad International Airport (GSO). The crew finds they have no charts for GSO, ORF or RIC and the FMS had no approaches for those airfields in the database. In the callback for more information, NASA researchers find the airline recently merged with another carrier and the carrier did not have approaches for some routinely assigned alternates. A company bulletin said the crews could build the approaches if needed, but did not include information on how to enter the information (ASRS Report #200803).

*A Saab 340B crew diverts after two missed approaches. At the alternate the crew finds the ILS has been NOTAMed out and the field is below non-precision minimums. The crew declares an emergency, diverts to a third field and lands with ". . . approximately 350 to 400 pounds of fuel" (ASRS Report #757558).

*An international cargo flight's destination is below landing minimums. The crew diverts to the primary alternate that goes below Cat II minimums. The next airfield, 168 nm distant, is no longer an option. Weather at the primary alternate remains below Cat II minimums but due to fuel, the crew requests and is cleared for the approach. The crew sees the runway at 101 feet agl and lands with half the scheduled landing fuel (ASRS Report #689992).

A second point that often shows up is the mistaken assumption by crews that declaring minimum fuel will result in priority handling. It will not. And to make matters worse, some pilots get huffy with ATC when they don't get priority handling. Some examples follow:

*A crew argues with a controller over holding and declares minimum fuel. When the controller then gives the crew holding instructions, the crew declares emergency fuel and lands the B-737 with 4,100 pounds of fuel (ASRS Report #636526).

*A B737 arriving at Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD) gets adamant with approach control. The PIC declares minimum fuel and gets upset when the controller does not immediately vector the flight to ORD. The pilot later wrote, we ". . . could not accept a heading away from ORD any longer." The controller asks the crew if they are declaring emergency fuel and the PIC advises, ". . . we are not declaring minimum fuel and could not accept any delay. . . . Just as I was about to declare an emergency and turn myself back toward ORD he gave us a turn to rejoin the arrival. Before switching back to approach control I asked the controller to have the supervisor mark the tapes and expect a call." The PIC calls the center and demands a Quality Assurance Review (ASRS Report #698814). One can only hope such antics resulted in a little face time with the local FSDO.

*A Saab 340B in Alaska faces higher than expected headwinds and this with an FAA inspector on the jump seat. The F/O advises the captain they will be low on fuel upon arrival. On final, low fuel lights illuminate and the flight lands with 30 minutes of fuel. The FAA inspector advises the crew he is very unhappy because they used some of their IFR reserve fuel (ASRS Report #611478).

*In another ASRS report (#627026), a hot air balloon pilot finds himself over a heavily wooded area with no landing site available and low on fuel. He attempts to land just beyond some power lines but misjudges his burn and levels off about five feet above the ground and settles into the power lines, causing them to short out. The pilot writes that he was familiar with the area and that, "If I had started with two full tanks I probably would have flown past this field and looked for another landing area."

Fuel and CRM Problems

ASRS Report #724197 involves fuel issues as well as CRM problems. The MD-80 F/O voices his concern about the fuel load prior to departure, but the captain assures him it is a "reasonable fuel load." Subsequently, the aircraft is not able to climb to planned cruise altitude due to weather, and the captain then elects to fly faster than planned Mach although the F/O protests. Only when planned tailwinds do not materialize does the captain listen to the F/O, who estimates arrival fuel will be around 4,000 pounds. At that point the captain diverts to alternate to refuel.

In ASRS Report #657354, the F/O is not only ignored, but when he reports a fuel situation to his safety manager, she tells him that his job is ". . . to protect the ego of the captain and not speak up unless I am about to die." During the flight the captain has two altitude excursions and the flight lands with less than 25 minutes of fuel on board.

A Learjet 55 crew mismanages fuel and lands with less than 500 pounds in the wings and 1,400 pounds in the fuselage tank. For reasons not explained in the ASRS, the crew does not open the transfer switch and on landing when tower asks the Learjet to expedite clearing the runway, the captain uses hard braking that causes both engines to flame out with the aircraft still on the runway (ASRS Report #077107).

If a crew is not clear about its fuel state, ATC may declare the flight an emergency and may or may not advise the crew.

A crew advises ATC the flight can neither accept new clearance nor lower altitude because descent will create a minimum fuel situation. ATC asks the crew if they are declaring minimum fuel and the crew says no. As a precaution, ATC declares the flight as an "emergency fuel flight" and turns it immediately for destination (ASRS Report #690021).

Likewise, an Airbus A300 captain is called in by his chief pilot to explain an emergency fuel situation. The PIC did not know ATC had declared the flight emergency fuel (ASRS Report #777808).

Summary

The ASRS reports paint a broad picture of how crews get into fuel problems. To help avoid putting yourself in a similar situation, here are some things to consider:

(1) Don't leave without sufficient fuel. That seems like a no-brainer, but it continues to happen.

(2) Although the flight may not require an alternate, have at least one and maybe a second alternate in the event the destination becomes unavailable.

(3) Be very careful when dispatched with an MEL, especially a fuel MEL. Some of the fuel may not be usable and there can be c.g. problems.

(4) Realize that if your destination becomes unavailable, your nearby alternates may also become unavailable. If it is good enough for you, others are also thinking of using it.

(5) Verify you have approach charts for your alternates and if your airplane is FMS equipped, that the information is in the database.

(6) Know the minimum and emergency fuel state and abide by it.

(7) Use the terms "minimum fuel" or "emergency fuel" when you reach your defined low-level fuel states.

( Do not expect priority handling unless you declare emergency fuel.

(9) If you wind up with an emergency fuel state, be prepared to do the unexpected such as fly unauthorized approaches, land without separation or land at airfields not in your operations specifications.

(10) Expect the possibility of a high workload.

And finally, if there's a choice between dancing before the chief pilot because you added fuel or diverted for more, and exhausting it in flight, smile and put on your dancing shoes. The latter is simply not acceptable.
 
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